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Carbon leakage and competitiveness of cement and steel industries under the EU ETS: much ado 
about nothing 
Abstract 
In a world of uneven climate policies, concerns about carbon leakage and competitiveness for heavy 
industries are the main arguments against the implementation of ambitious climate policies. In this 
paper we investigate a potential competitiveness-driven carbon leakage due to the European Union 
Emission Trading scheme (EU ETS). We focus on two energy-intensive sectors, cement and steel, 
and phases I and II of the EU ETS. From a simple analytical model, we derive an equation linking net 
imports of cement and steel to local and foreign demand along with carbon price. We then 
econometrically estimate this relation both with ARIMA regression and Prais-Winsten estimation, 
finding that local and foreign demand are robust drivers of trade ﬂows. We ﬁnd no signiﬁcant eﬀect of 
the carbon price on net imports of steel and cement. We conclude that there is no evidence of carbon 
leakage in these sectors, at least in the short run. 
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Fuites de carbone et compétitivité des industries de l’acier et du ciment sous l’EU ETS : beaucoup de 
bruit pour rien 
Résumé 
Dans un monde aux politiques climatiques hétérogènes, les préoccupations concernant les fuites de 
carbone et les pertes de compétitivité des industries lourdes sont les principaux arguments contre 
l’élaboration de politiques climatiques ambitieuses. Dans cet article nous enquêtons sur d’éventuelles 
fuites de carbone dues à la perte de compétitivité provoquées par le marché européen du carbone 
(EU ETS). Nous nous concentrons sur deux secteurs énergie-intensifs, le ciment et l’acier, ainsi que 
les phases I et II de l’EU ETS. A partir d’un modèle analytique simple, nous dérivons une équation 
reliant les importations nettes de ciment et d’acier aux demandes locales et internationales ainsi qu’au 
prix du carbone. Dans un second temps, nous estimons économétriquement cette relation à la fois par 
une régression ARIMA et par une régression Prais-Winsten. Nous trouvons que les demandes locales 
et internationales sont des facteurs robustes expliquant les flux commerciaux. Nous ne trouvons en 
revanche pas d’effet significatif du prix du carbone sur les importations nettes d’acier et de ciment. 
Nous en concluons qu’il n’y a pas de preuve de fuites de carbone dans ces secteurs, au moins à court 
terme. 
 
Mots-clés : : EU ETS, compétitivité, fuites de carbone, industries énergie-intensives, ARIMA, Prais-
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Abstract
In a world of uneven climate policies, concerns about carbon leakage and com-
petitiveness for heavy industries are the main arguments against the implemen-
tation of ambitious climate policies. In this paper we investigate a potential
competitiveness-driven carbon leakage due to the European Union Emission
Trading scheme (EU ETS). We focus on two energy-intensive sectors, cement
and steel, and phases I and II of the EU ETS. From a simple analytical model,
we derive an equation linking net imports of cement and steel to local and for-
eign demand along with carbon price. We then econometrically estimate this
relation both with ARIMA regression and Prais-Winsten estimation, finding
that local and foreign demand are robust drivers of trade flows. We find no
significant effect of the carbon price on net imports of steel and cement. We
conclude that there is no evidence of carbon leakage in these sectors, at least in
the short run.
Key-words
EU ETS, competitiveness, carbon leakage, EITE industries, ARIMA, Prais-
Winsten
1. Introduction
With international climate negotiations at a standstill, a world of fragmented
regional climate policies is emerging (Rayner, 2010) and the perspective of a
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worldwide carbon price has been postponed. The main regional climate pricing
experiment so far is the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS),
which is presented as the EU flagship climate policy. The EU ETS entered its
third phase in 2013, after a first test phase (2005-2007) and a second phase
corresponding to the period of compliance for the Kyoto protocol (2008-2012).
Different carbon markets have been implemented since then (Hood, 2010; World
Bank & Ecofys, 2013) but they remain modest in their ambition. In the two
main emitting countries (China and the US), only a minority of states and cities
are covered by an ETS. Even in the EU, the current economic downturn has
created a massive surplus of allowances, approximating 2 billion tonnes, i.e. one
year of emissions (European Commission, 2012), and reduced the CO2 allowance
price to 5 euros vs. around 25 until mid-2008. The European institutions have
not yet agreed to reduce the surplus of allowances.
Although there are different reasons for this worldwide lack of ambitious
climate policies, among the main ones is the possible threat to the competi-
tiveness of heavy industries and the resulting carbon leakage. The argument
goes as follows: carbon-constrained industries may face additional costs vis-à-vis
their foreign competitors. This comparative disadvantage may induce immedi-
ate losses of market share to the benefit of foreign competitors (operational
leakage) or at a longer term location of energy-intensive industries in regions
with more favorable climate policies (investment leakage)(Reinaud, 2008b). As
a result, emissions would rise in non-constrained countries (“carbon leakage”1),
weakening or nullifying climate policy efficiency. Moreover, the additional cost
generated by the climate policy may reduce the domestic industry’s market
share, destroy jobs and reduce profits. Such adverse effects are grouped to-
gether under the heading of a loss in “competitiveness,” a term the popularity
of which is inversely proportional to its clarity.
Not only has the threat of carbon leakage reduced the environmental ambi-
tion of climate policies (increasing the global cap in the EU ETS), it has pushed
public authorities to distribute a large part of allowances for free, generating
economic distortions (Meunier et al., 2012) and limiting the use of allowance
revenue to reduce preexisting taxes or to produce public goods.
Unfortunately, the existing evidence about the amount of carbon leakage and
losses in competitiveness that can be expected from a given climate policy is not
conclusive (cf. section 2 below). Among ex ante studies, general equilibrium
models point to a positive but limited leakage at the aggregate level (typically
from 5% to 25%) while for some carbon-intensive sectors like steel or cement,
a higher leakage rate is sometimes forecast (Oikonomou et al., 2006; Demailly
1Another carbon leakage mechanism is the “international fossil fuel channel”: emission
reductions go hand in hand with lowering fossil fuel consumption, which drives down fossil
fuel prices and in return makes them more attractive for regions with laxer climate policies.
Hence all else being equal, they consume more fossil fuels and emit more. Nonetheless, the
diffusion to third countries of low-carbon technologies that were favored by the climate policy
(climate spillovers) has the opposite effect and induces negative leakage (Gerlagh and Kuik,
2007). We do not address these mechanisms in the present paper.
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and Quirion, 2006). Moreover, the few existing ex post studies do not afford
consistent conclusions.
The present paper aims at filling this gap by econometrically assessing the
operational leakage2 over the first two phases of the EU ETS, in the two most
emitting manufacturing industry sectors: cement and steel. The methodology
is to econometrically estimate a relationship, obtained via an analytic model,
between net imports (imports minus exports) and the carbon price, controlling
for other factors that may influence net imports such as economic activity in
and outside Europe. Using two different econometric techniques that provide
consistent results, we conclude that net imports of cement and steel have been
driven by domestic and foreign demand but not by the CO2 allowance price,
falsifying the claim that the ETS has generated leakage, at least in the short
run.
The remainder of the article is as follows. Section 2 provides a review of
the literature on empirical studies focusing on environmental regulations and
trade. Section 3 gives an overview of the industry contexts of the different
studied sectors. Section 4 explains the methodology (model and data). Section
5 details the results discussed in section 6.
2. Litterature review
Whereas carbon pricing is relatively new, environmental regulations on lo-
cal pollutants have a much longer history. For example the Clean Air Act was
implemented in the US during the 1970s, well before climate change was on
the agenda. Therefore the first studies empirically assessing the impacts of en-
vironmental regulations on trade dealt with local pollution issues and tested
the pollution haven hypothesis/effect (Kalt, 1988; Tobey, 1990; Grossman and
Krueger, 1993; Jaffe et al., 1995). The migration of dirty industries to coun-
tries with lower environmental standards (pollution havens) depends both on
the environmental regulatory gap and on trade tariffs. In the pollution haven
hypothesis (respectively effect), the first (respectively the second) factor is hold
constant3. The pollution haven hypothesis was a major concern during the ne-
gotiations of the North American Free Trade Agreements in the 1990s (Jaffe
et al., 1995), but as the decrease in trade tariffs has seemed to slow down, the
pollution haven effect has become a more relevant concern (and carbon leak-
age due the EU ETS would be a “carbon haven effect” (Branger and Quirion,
2013a)).
The prevailing conclusion of the pollution haven literature is that environ-
mental regulations have a small to negligible impact on relocations (Oikonomou
et al., 2006). After a first wave of inconclusive works (Eskeland and Harrison,
2A distinction can be made between leakage that occurs in the presence of capacity con-
straints in the short term, termed operational leakage and leakage which occurs in the longer
term via the impacts of the EU-ETS on investment policy, termed investment leakage (Climate
Strategies, 2013).
3For a more elaborated presentation and discussion of these notions, cf. Kuik et al. (2013).
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2003), a second generation of studies have statistically demonstrated significant
but small pollution haven effects using panels of data and industry or coun-
try fixed effects (Levinson and Taylor, 2008). Many reasons have been invoked
to explain why the widely believed fear of environmental relocations was not
observed. Some have pointed out that environmental regulations are not a
main driver of relocations contrary to economic growth in emerging countries
(Smarzynska, 2002), or that pollution abatement represents a small fraction
of costs compared to other costs or barriers that still favor production in in-
dustrialized countries (Oikonomou et al., 2006) such as tariffs, transport costs,
labor productivity, volatility in exchange rates and political risk. Others high-
light that heavy industries are very capital-intensive and tend to be located in
capital-abundant countries, or that their capital intensity makes them less prone
to relocate than “footloose” industries (Ederington et al., 2003). Finally, the
Porter hypothesis (Porter and Van der Linde, 1995), implying that regulations
bring cost-reducing innovations, has also been cited.
The pollution haven literature is mostly related to command-and-control
regulations for local pollutants, whereas the EU ETS is a cap-and-trade system
for carbon emissions. Some studies evaluate policies which are closer to the
EU ETS such as environmental taxation in some European countries. Miltner
and Salmons (2009) studied the impact of environmental tax reforms (ETR)
on competitiveness indicators for seven European countries and eight sectors
and found that, out of 56 cases, the impact of ETR on competitiveness was
insignificant in 80% of cases, positive in 4% and negative for only 16% of the
cases (Miltner and Salmons 2009). However, energy-intensive sectors benefited
from exemptions and lower rates of taxation. Costantini and Mazzanti (2012)
used a gravity model to analyse the impact on trade flows of environmental and
innovation policies in Europe and revealed a Porter-like mechanism: when the
regulatory framework is followed by private innovation, environmental policies
seem to foster rather than undermine export dynamics.
The question of carbon leakage was also a relevant issue for the Kyoto pro-
tocol. Aichele and Felbermayr (2012) assessed the impact of the Kyoto protocol
on CO2 emissions, CO2 footprint and CO2 net imports, using a differences-in-
differences approach with the International Criminal Court participation as an
instrumental variable for Kyoto ratification. They concluded that the Kyoto
protocol has reduced domestic emissions by about 7%, but has not changed the
carbon footprint (CO2 net imports increased by about 14%). Though they do
not explicitly formulate it, their results lead to a carbon leakage estimation of
about 100%, contrasting with the other empirical studies. However, two caveats
are in order. First, China became a member of the WTO in 2002, just when
most developed countries were ratifying the protocol. Since most CO2 net im-
ports are due to trade with China, the rise in net imports may well be due
to China World Trade Organization (WTO) membership rather than to the
Kyoto protocol. Second, apart from those covered by the EU ETS, countries
with a Kyoto target have not adopted significant policies to reduce emissions
in the manufacturing industry. Hence, if Kyoto had caused leakage (through
the competitiveness channel), it should show up on the CO2 net imports of
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countries covered by the EU ETS rather than on CO2 net imports of countries
covered by a Kyoto target. However, when the authors include both EU mem-
bership and the existence of a Kyoto target in the regression, they report that
EU membership does not increase CO2 imports.
Some papers use econometric models to empirically investigate the impact
of climate policies on heavy industries ex ante, using energy prices as a proxy.
Gerlagh and Mathys (2011) studied the links between energy abundance and
trade in 14 countries in Europe, Asia and America. They found that energy is a
major driver for sector location through specialisation, but they do not quantify
relocations under uneven carbon policies. Aldy and Pizer (2011) focused on the
US but used a richer sectoral disaggregation. The authors concluded that a $15
price of CO2 would not significantly affect the US manufacturing industry as a
whole, but that some sectors would be harder hit with a decrease of about 3%
in their production.
The EU ETS has constituted a subject of research for a body of empirical
studies on different topics: abatement estimation (Ellerman and Buchner, 2008;
Delarue et al., 2008), impact of investment and innovation (Calel and Deche-
zleprêtre, 2012; Martin et al., 2012), distributional effects (Sijm et al. 2006,
de Bruyn et al. 2010, Alexeeva-Talebi 2011), determinants of the CO2 price
(Alberola et al., 2008; Mansanet-Bataller et al., 2011; Hintermann, 2010), but
only a limited number of ex post studies have investigated carbon leakage in
relation to the EU ETS.
So far, these studies have not revealed any statistical evidence of carbon leak-
age and losses in competitiveness for heavy industries in the EU ETS. Zachman
et al. (2011), using firm level panel data and a matching procedure between
regulated and unregulated firms, found no evidence that the ETS affected com-
panies profits. Studying the impact of carbon price on trade flows, several
studies found no evidence of competitiveness-driven operational leakage for the
different sectors at risk of the EU ETS: aluminium (Reinaud, 2008a; Sartor,
2013; Ellerman et al., 2010; Quirion, 2011), oil refining (Lacombe, 2008), ce-
ment and steel (Ellerman et al., 2010; Quirion, 2011). These results contrast
with ex ante studies, generally with CGE models (Böhringer et al., 2012) but
also with sectoral partial equilibrium models (Monjon and Quirion 2011) that
forecast an aggregated carbon leakage ratio in a range of 5% to 25% (Branger
and Quirion, 2013b) and even more with studies devoted to the cement and
steel sectors, which conclude to a leakage ratio in a range of 20% to 60%.
Our work goes beyond the above-mentioned studies on several points. First,
more data is available as the EU ETS has entered its third phase after eight
years of functioning. Second, we introduce a new variable as a proxy for de-
mand outside the EU, which improves the explanatory power of the economet-
ric model. Third, the estimated equations are based on a structural economic
model. Finally, we use several time-series regression techniques, which improves
the robustness of the results.
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3. Industry contexts
Cement and steel are both heavy industries affected by the EU ETS. They
are the two largest CO2 emitters among European manufacturing sectors, rep-
resenting 10% and 9% respectively of the allowance allocations in the EU ETS
(Trotignon, 2012). However they rank differently along the two dimensions gen-
erally retained for assessing whether a sector is at risk of carbon leakage, i.e.
carbon intensity and openness to international trade (Hourcade et al., 2007;
Juergens et al., 2013). Cement is very carbon-intensive but only moderately
open to international trade while steel features lower carbon intensity but higher
trade openness.
3.1. Cement
Calcination of limestone and burning of fossil fuel (mainly coal and petroleum
coke) to heat material at high temperature make the cement manufacturing
process very carbon-intensive (around 650kg of CO2 per tonne4). Cement pro-
duction embodies 5% of worldwide emissions (IEA, 2009).
The raw material of cement, limestone, is present in abundant quantities
all over the world. Moreover, the value per tonne of cement is relatively low.
Because of these two features, cement is produced in virtually all countries
around the world and is only moderately traded internationally (only 3.8% of
cement was traded internationally in 2011 (ICR, 2012)). China represents the
lion’s share of cement consumption and production around the world, due to the
large scale developments and infrastructure build-up projects that the Chinese
government is undertaking. In 2011, 57% of the 3.6 billion tonnes of cement
were produced in China, and the second country producer, India, was far behind
with 6% of world production (ICR, 2012).
Cement is a sector where international competition is low (Selim and Salem,
2010). Because of low value per tonne and market concentration, important
price differences remain even within Europe (Ponssard andWalker, 2008). Prices
are higher and producers have more market power inland than near the coasts
because transportation costs are much lower by sea than by road.
Clinker is the major raw material for cement (Portland cement, the most
common type of cement is made up of 95% of clinker). Its production accounts
for most of the CO2 emitted in the manufacturing process, and it can be trans-
ported more easily. Therefore in the cement sector, carbon leakage is more likely
to happen through clinker trade than through cement trade.
3.2. Steel
Steel is produced either from iron ore and coal using the Blast Furnace -
Basic Oxygen Furnaces (BOF) route, for around 70% of world production, or
from steel scrap in Electric Arc Furnaces (EAF), for 29% of world production in
4source: WBCSD, Getting the Numbers Right database, accessed December 2013.
http://wbcsdcement.org/index.php/key-issues/climate-protection/gnr-database
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2011 (WSA, 2012). The BOF process is roughly five times more carbon-intensive
than the EAF but the share of the latter is limited by scrap availability. Steel
is very carbon-intensive and accounts for 6% of worldwide emissions (Carbon
Trust, 2011b).
Like cement but to a lesser extent, China embodies most of the world steel
consumption and production: 45% of the 1,518 million tonnes of 2011 world
production (followed by the EU with 12%). Steel has a much higher value-
added per tonne than cement (roughly ten times more) and is thus more widely
traded. In 2011, 31% of finished steel products were internationally traded
(WSA, 2012).
Steel prices, are more homogenous than cement prices and steel futures are
sold even on the London Metal Stock exchange. International competition is
higher in steel than in cement (Ecorys, 2008).
Table 1: Summary characteristics of the two sectors. Sources: (WCA, 2011;
WSA, 2012; ICR, 2012; CWR, 2011; Carbon Trust, 2011a; Holmes et al., 2011)
Cement Steel
% of World GHG emissions 5% 6%
Carbon intensity1 0.6-0.8 2-4 (BOF)
0.2-0.9 (EAF)
World Production2 3,600 1,514
Top Producer (2011) China (57%) China (47%)
Other Main Producers EU27, India EU27, Japan, US
Bulkiness ($/tonne) 45-150 500-800
Trade intensity3 3.8% (2011) 31.4% (2011)
Market concentration4 25% 27.5%
Largest Company Lafarge ArcelorMittal
(2011 - % production) 5% 6.4%
International competition Low Moderate
1 Tonnes of CO2 per tonne of output
2 2011. Million tonnes
3 % of world production traded internationally
4 Top 10 companies’ share in production
4. Methodology and data
Our goal is to study the impact of carbon price on competitiveness-driven
operational leakage, at a geographically aggregated level (European Union versus
the rest of the world) for two sectors “deemed to be exposed at risk of carbon
leakage:” cement and steel.
If carbon leakage occurs, it is through the trade of carbon intensive products.
An indicator of carbon leakage is then a change in international trade flows
7
(a) Cement
(b) Steel
Figure 1: World production of cement and steel (sources : (WSA, 2012; ICR,
2012)
8
of carbon-constraint products (measured by net imports, i.e. imports minus
exports).
4.1. Analytical model
We build the simplest possible model capable of featuring carbon leakage.
Industries of two regions, e (Europe) and r (rest of the world) are in perfect
competition. Therefore the price in each region is equal to the marginal cost.
This perfect competition may seem a bold hypothesis, especially for the cement
sector, which, in at least some countries, is rather concentrated. However, intro-
ducing imperfect competition would significantly complicate the model without
necessarily bringing new insights. For example, Cournot competition may re-
duce the sensitivity of net imports to a price asymmetry and thus leakage, but
the results would then become very sensitive to the shape of the demand curve
(Demailly and Quirion, 2008).
There is no product differentiation. This assumption, like perfect competi-
tion, is chosen for the sake of simplicity. Moreover, we neglect transportation
costs for two reasons. First, their introduction would hinder the ability to pro-
duce a simple equation to estimate. Second, the estimation of the model with
transport costs causes problems of endogeneity (net imports of cement and steel
are drivers of shipping costs). Finally, we assume fixed demand, i.e. world de-
mand is not dependent on world price p.
We suppose production costs are quadratic, so marginal costs are linear. The
extra cost due to the climate policy (only in region e) is strictly proportional to
production. The marginal cost of production, which equals the world price in
both regions, is then
p = cie + CO2Cost + cseqe (1)
in Europe and
p = cir + csrqr (2)
in the rest of the world, where qe and qr are the productions in regions e and r,
CO2Cost the carbon cost times specific emissions5 plus the abatement cost per
unit produced, if any, cie and cse (respectively cir and csr) parameters of the
production cost in Europe (respectively the rest of the world).
Trade occurs between the two regions, and we note qm the net imports from
region r to region e. The demands in regions e and r are :
5Hence we assume that firms maximise profit taking the full opportunity cost of CO2 al-
lowances into consideration. If, on the opposite, firms take only the cost of the CO2 allowances
they must buy into account, no impact can be expected since cement and steel benefited from
a large over-allocation in the period considered.
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de = qe + qm (3)
dr = qr − qm (4)
cse×(3) - csr×(4) leads to:
(cse + csr)qm = csede − csrdr − cseqe + csrqr (5)
Using (1) and (2) to substitute cseqe and csrqr respectively, and dividing by
(cse + csr) we finally obtain:
qm =
cie − cir
cse + csr
+ 1
cse + csr
CO2Cost +
cse
cse + csr
de +
−csr
cse + csr
dr (6)
4.2. Estimated equation
A reformulation of (6) is:
NImpCement,t =αCCO2pricet−3 + βCConsEU,t−3
+ γCIndBRICS,t−3 + constC + εC,t
(7)
for cement, and
NImpSteel,t =αSCO2pricet−3 + βSIndEU,t−3
+ γSIndBRICS,t−3 + constS + εS,t
(8)
for steel, where αC , βC , γC , αS , βS , and γS are the coefficients to be estimated
while εC,t and εS,t are the residuals, which we assume to be IID, that is later
to be tested. The variables are (the source of the data will be detailed in 4.4):
• Net imports (NImp), or imports minus exports, for each of the two sectors,
between the EU27 and the rest of the World. This is the predicated vari-
able, and a proxy for operational leakage. The choice of the geographical
delimitation (EU27) is not trivial. Indeed in 2007, the two new member
states, Bulgaria and Romania, joined the EU ETS. One year later, the
EU ETS welcomed Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein, countries not in
the European Union. As the purpose of this article is to study the im-
pact of the EU ETS on competitiveness and leakage, another option was
to consider an EU ETS geographical coverage changing over time. This
would have posed econometric problems since it would have introduced
shocks in the time series. Since these five countries do not produce a sig-
nificant share of European production, we judge that it was a preferable
option not to take these changes into account.
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• CO2 price. This is the main regression variable. In the presence of op-
erational leakage due to losses in competitiveness, a positive relationship
is expected. Indeed, a high carbon price would induce an increase in the
production cost of European products, a loss of market share of European
industries vis-à-vis their foreign competitors, and an increase in net im-
ports. We consider the EUA future price (one year ahead) for two reasons.
First, contrary to the spot price, it did not collapse in 2007, which would
have biased the econometrical estimation (Creti et al. (2012); Bredin and
Muckley (2011); Conrad et al. (2012) use the future price for the same
reason). Second, future prices are available from 2004 (contrary to 2005
for spot prices), which adds one more year (or twelve more points) to the
time series and thus makes the econometric estimation more robust.
• EU industrial output, EU construction index and BRICS industrial out-
put (IndEU , ConsEU and IndBRICS). The industrial output is a proxy
for the industrial economic activity and therefore the demand side (either
domestic or foreign). For cement, we used the European construction in-
dex instead of the European industrial output to proxy the demand as
construction is the main outlet for cement. We did not find a satisfactory
construction index for the BRICS so we used the industrial output for
both steel and cement. An increase in local demand is expected to in-
crease the demand of imports and reduce production capacities available
for exports. We therefore expect a positive (respectively negative) rela-
tion for the European (respectively BRICS) industrial output. We chose
to focus on BRICS countries instead of taking an aggregated industrial
production index for the rest of the world because to our knowledge such
a global index does not exist. Moreover, BRICS countries are the engine
of global economic growth: from 8% in 1999, they represented in 2011
20% or the world’s GDP. The consumption of cement and steel in BRICS
countries (and especially in China) has soared over the last decade. They
are not the major destination of EU27 steel exports; however, they are
the origin of a noticeable part of EU27 cement and steel imports (China
and Russia for steel, China for cement especially between 2005 and 2008)
as well as cement exports recently (Russia and Brazil).
To take into account the fact that the potential effect of carbon price on net
imports is not instantaneous but necessitates some time (time between produc-
tion and sale), we introduce a lag in the dependant variables. We select a lag of
three months since it brings the best fit6, as measured by the usual indicators7
4.3. Econometrical techniques
Two aspects are potential barriers to the validity of econometric estimations:
endogeneity and the issue of autocorrelation of residuals, since we work on time
6The results are very robust to a change in the lag (from 1 to 5 months), except for cement
in the ARIMA regressions. These results are available upon request
7R2 for the Prais-Winsten regression and the AIC for the ARIMA regression
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(a) Cement
(b) Steel
Figure 2: Origin of EU27 imports
12
series data.
First let us consider the thorny issue of endogeneity. It is necessary that
variables aimed at explaining the variations of net imports be truly exogenous
to validate our econometrical modeling. Such would not be the case if the net
imports of cement or steel impacted these explanatory variables. Cement and
steel sectors each stand for less than 10% of the covered emissions in the EU
ETS. As most of the production is consumed within the EU, variations in net
imports induce much less important production variations. It is therefore highly
likely that variations in net imports do not affect the carbon price.
Another source of endogeneity would be that an omitted variable would
impact both our main regression variable, the CO2 price, and the predicated
variable. Among the price determinants of the carbon price one can cite the
economic activity (which is in the regression with IndEU or ConsEU ), political
decisions, energy prices (mainly coal and gas8) and unexpected weather varia-
tions9 (Alberola et al., 2008; Hintermann, 2010). It seems unlikely that political
decisions related to the EU ETS and unexpected weather variations would im-
pact net imports of cement and steel otherwise than potentially through carbon
price. Energy prices affect production costs but we suppose that the effect is the
same for production outside Europe because prices are determined on a global
scale for coal and petcoke, the main energy carriers used for cement and steel
production. Therefore, the effect would be compensated between imports and
exports.
A simple linear regression would give spurious results because of a strong
autocorrelation of error terms, as in many time series data. As the Augmented
Dickey-Fuller test shows, all time series are I(1), as we cannot reject the hy-
pothesis of a unit root for the time series but we can for their first difference
(see results in annex). To treat the question of autocorrelation of residuals,
we use two different methods. The first one is the Prais-Winsten estimation,
which is an improvement of the Cochrane-Orchutt algorithm10. The second one
is the classically used model in time series analysis, the ARIMA(p,1,q) model.
We identified the ARIMA(p,1,q) process that suits each dependent variable
by following the Box and Jenkins methodology and found ARIMA(5,1,3) and
ARIMA(6,1,4) for cement and steel respectively. We used the Ljung-Box-Pierce
8An increase in coal price (resp. gas price) makes this source of energy less attractive for
electricity production. Therefore the emissions are lower (resp. higher) than expected and
the carbon price decreases (resp. increases)
9Because unexpected cold waves and heat waves generally induce the use of very carbon
intensive power plants
10In a series of recent articles, McCallum (2010), Kolev (2011) and Zhang (2013) have
concluded that most so-called "spurious regression" problems are solved by applying the
traditional methods of autocorrelation correction, like the iterated Cochrane-Orchutt pro-
cedure (Cochrane and Orcutt, 1949). However, other authors, including Martínez-Rivera and
Ventosa-Santaulària (2012), Sollis (2011) and Ventosa-Santaularia (2012), have argued that
these procedures do not always avoid spurious regressions and propose to pre-test the data
and first-differentiating them if they appear to be I(1). Hence we apply both methods in this
paper.
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test (which will be explained in further detail in part 5.2) to evaluate the results.
Longer time series give more robust estimations, but including the carbon
price for the period 1999-2012 would give spurious results, since there is a break
in the time series (this variable is at zero during 1999-2003, then positive). We
performed the first regression to have a most robust estimation of net imports
depending on local and foreign demand. Then we undertook a second regression
for the period 2004-2012 including the carbon price. Comparing the results
allows assessing whether the previous estimation is robust in time and examining
the effect of adding a carbon price.
4.4. Data
All the data are monthly from January 1999 to December 2012 (168 points),
except for the carbon prices taken from January 2004 to December 2012 (108
points).
• Net imports of cement and steel of EU27. Eurostat international trade
database11. For cement we take clinker into account, as this semi-finished
product is more prone to carbon leakage. For steel, we consider iron and
steel in the broad sense, which includes pig iron and semi-finished steel
products. The original values in 100kg are converted into Mt/year (with
the formula 1Mt/year=833333.3 100kg/month).
• CO2 price. Carbon prices are taken from Tendances Carbone edited by
CDC Climat12.
• EU industrial output and EU construction index. Eurostat database13.
They are both normalized at 2005=100.
• BRICS industrial output. Several steps were necessary to compute this
index. First, for Brazil, Russia, India and South Africa, the productions
in total manufacturing (normalized at 2005=100), were available on the
Federal Reserve of Saint Louis Economic Research website14 derived from
the OECD Main Economic Indicators database. China’s published indus-
trial statistics are far from being open and the scattered available data
are confusing (with changes in variables, in coverage, in measurement,
and in presentation). Holtz (2013) reviewed the available official data and
constructed a monthly industrial output series. Monthly industrial out-
put (economy-wide constant price) was taken from this paper for the years
1999 to 2011, and extended for the year 2012 thanks to online data15 giving
11EU27 Trade Since 1988 by HS2, 4, 6 and CN8 dataset (extracted in April 2013). The
respective codes for cement and steel are 2523 (cement, including clinker, whether or not
coloured) and 72 (iron and steel)
12http://www.cdcclimat.com/-Publications-8-.html
13Production in industry and Production in construction- monthly data (extracted in April
2013)
14http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/
15http://www.tradingeconomics.com/china/industrial-production
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Figure 3: EUA price
an annual increase rate of industrial output every month. The obtained
data are cyclical: the industrial production is at its highest in December
and at its lowest in January and February. We regress the log of this
industrial output over time and monthly dummies to estimate seasonal
factors, then we withdraw these factors from the original data to obtain
a seasonally adjusted Chinese industrial output (which we normalize at
2005=100). Finally, the BRICS industrial output is the weighted mean of
national industrial outputs (the weights are the 2005 GDP16).
5. Results
5.1. Descriptive statistics
Table 2: Summary statistics of the regression variables
Variable Obs Mean Std dev Min (date) Max (date)
NImpCement 168 0.19 7.34 -17.95 Jun 2012 19.57 Mar 2007
NImpSteel 168 -0.35 13.07 -26.56 Aug 2012 35.62 Jan 2007
CO2price 108 14.89 5.55 6.60 Dec 2012 27.60 Mar 2006
ConsEU 168 97.10 5.83 84.16 Feb 2012 110.44 Feb 2008
IndEU 168 99.86 5.52 89.67 Apr 2009 113.10 Jan 2008
IndBRICS 168 113.38 35.51 63.18 Feb 1999 178.46 Dec 2012
Obs=Observations Std dev=Standard deviation
Future carbon prices (see Figure 3) existed in January 2004, one year before
the beginning of the EU ETS in January 2005, and oscillated at around 8 euros.
16United Nations (http://unstats.un.org/unsd/snaama/dnltransfer.asp?fID=2)
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They then increased rapidly during the beginning of phase I of the EU ETS to
fluctuate at around 25 euros between June 2005 and April 2006. The release of
2005 verified emissions suggested that most of the installations had emitted less
than their number of allowances. As no banking was allowed between phase I
(2005-2007) and phase II (2008-2012), this surplus of allowances led to a crash
of the carbon spot price, and a severe decrease in the future price. During the
second phase, the EUA price rose as during the first phase to exceed 20 euros,
then fell under 10 euros as it appeared that the economic crisis was going to
noticeably reduce the demand for allowances. For two years from June 2009 to
June 2011, the carbon price was stable between 13 and 16 euros. The carbon
price fell under 5 euros six months later for several reasons (duration of the
economic crisis in Europe due to the sovereign debt crisis, interaction with other
energy efficiency or renewable climate policies reducing the demand, increasing
of allowances), and remained at this price for the year 2012.
The net imports of cement (see Figure 4) increasingly rose from 1999 to
reach a peak in March 2007 at 20 Mtonnes per year then continuously fell with
a recent severe collapse at the beginning of 2012. In 2009, the EU became a net
exporter of cement whereas it was a net importer from 2001 to 2007.
The steel net imports (see Figure 5) oscillated at around zero from 1999
to 2005, then the EU became a net importer from 2005 to 2008. Net imports
peaked in summer 2007, with 33 Mtonnes per year then collapsed the same year.
After a rebound up to 20 Mtonnes per year, the steel net imports fell during
the economic crisis. Since then, with the exception of the beginning of 2011,
the EU has been a net exporter of steel.
At first sight, cement and steel net imports and the carbon price do not seem
highly correlated. The two high carbon price periods (2005-2006 and 2008) most
of the time did not coincide with high net imports. On the contrary, for these
two products, net imports reached their peak in 2007, while the spot carbon
price was very low. Still, it was also a time of intense industrial activity in
Europe, a parameter that is taken into account in the regression.
The EU industrial output increased slightly from 1999 to 2008, then col-
lapsed during the economic recession (by about 20% in six months to go back
to its level 10 years before). After a rebound until 2011 without reaching its
pre-crisis level, it fell a second time. The EU construction index is very similar,
except it plummeted less sharply during the financial crisis, though it never
recovered. The BRICS industrial output presents some differences. First, con-
trary to the EU industrial output, which did not change significantly between
1999 and 2012, the BRICS industrial output almost tripled during the same pe-
riod. Also hit by the global financial crisis, it took only a year to get back to its
pre-crisis level. Contrary to its European equivalent, it has grown steadily since
then. Year 2011 marked a discrepancy in industrial activities between Europe
and the BRICS. Whereas the EU was getting bogged down in a deep economic
and industrial recession, the BRICS manufacturing industries were flourishing.
For econometric considerations, as the two series before 2011 were much better
correlated, this outcome is also of interest to prevent an identification problem.
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(a) Cement
(b) Cement (first difference)
Figure 4: Net Imports (Imports minus Exports) of Cement
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(a) Steel
(b) Steel (first difference)
Figure 5: Net Imports (Imports minus Exports) of Steel
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Figure 6: Other regression variables
5.2. Regression results
The results are visible in tables 3 and 5 for the ARIMA estimations17, and
in tables 4 and 6 for the Prais-Winsten estimations. We recall that for each
sector, two estimations are performed, one without the carbon price, for the
period 1999-2012, and one with the carbon price for the period 2004-2012 (see
section 4.3). Comparing the results with the second regression makes it possible
to examine the impact of adding a carbon price.
For the ARIMA regressions, the quality of the regressions is assessed with
several diagnostic tests: the log-likelihood, the Schwartz and Akaike information
criterions (SIC and AIC), and the Ljung-Box-Pierce statistic (Q test) with a
maximum number of lags of 40. The null hypothesis in this test is that the
residuals are not autocorrelated, so the observed correlations are just a result of
randomness. The critical region for rejection of the hypothesis of randomness is
when Q is higher than the α-quantile of a chi-squared distribution. If we take
α = 5%, the model is validated if "Prob>chi(40)">5%, though a higher p-value
indicates that the model is a better fit. For the Prais-Winsten estimations, we
give the value of R2 and the Durbin-Watson test (which is close to 2 if there is
no autocorrelation in the residuals) before and after transformation.
In all the ARIMA regressions, the Q-tests validate that the residuals are
white noise and in all the Prais-Winsten regressions, the Durbin-Watson tests
assure that the residuals are not autocorrelated.
For cement, in regression (1) in table 3, both ConsEU,t−3 and IndBRICS,t−3
are significant, at the 5% and 1% levels respectively . Hence, we verify that
indicators of local and foreign demand carry explanatory power in cement net
imports. Indeed, an increase in local demand is expected to increase the demand
17For simplicity we do not display the values of the constant term and the ARIMA terms.
More detailed results are available upon request
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of imports and reduce production capacities available for exports18. In our
model, an increase of 10 points in local demand 19 would induce an increase
of about 3 million tonnes of net imports. Moreover, we notice that the signs
of the estimated coefficients of ConsEU,t−3 and IndBRICS,t−3 conform to the
theoretical model (equation (6)). The Ljung-Box-Pierce test validates that the
residuals of regression (1) are not autocorrelated.
The coefficients of ConsEU,t−3 and IndBRICS,t−3 in regression (2) are very
similar to the coefficients of regression (1), and statistically significant at the
10% and 5% levels respectively. This similarity indicates that the relation-
ship between the cement net imports and local and foreign demand is robust.
CO2pricet−3 is not statistically significant : the carbon price has no impact on
the cement net import variations. The results of (1)bis and (2)bis in table 4 are
close to the results of (1) and (2), which is reassuring for the robustness of the
results. The coefficients, except for the carbon price, are all significant at the
1% level.
For steel (regression (3) in table 5), IndEU,t−3 is significant at the 1% level,
but IndBRICS,t−3 is not statistically significant, whereas in (3)bis they are both
significant at the 1% level. Only the local demand carries explanatory power in
the ARIMA model, while both local and foreign demands do so in the Prais-
Winsten estimation. The impact of the local demand is bigger in the steel
industry than in the cement industry20 compared to the cement net imports:
an increase of 10 points in local demand would lead to an increase of about
9 million tonnes in net imports. As for cement, the similarity between the
results of the two periods implies that the relationship between the steel net
imports, local and foreign demand is robust. Similarly to the cement industry,
the coefficient of the carbon price CO2pricet−3 is not statistically significant.
6. Discussion
The relationship between net imports and European or foreign demand that
was predicted by the analytic model is confirmed by the empirical analysis. An
increase in local (respectively foreign) demand increases (respectively decreases)
net imports. The fit is particularly good for the cement industry and a little
less so for the steel industry.
Furthermore, our empirical model does not support the hypothesis that a
high carbon price would induce an increase in net imports. For cement and steel,
the coefficient of the carbon price has no explanatory power on net imports, even
18When carrying Prais-Winsten regressions for imports and exports separately instead of
just net imports (results available upon request), we observe that the signs of the demand
coefficients still conform to predictions. An increase in local demand induces an increase of
imports and a decrease of exports (and the other way around for foreign demand).
19The demand was normalized at 100 in 2005
20The approximate size of cement net imports are a bit more than half as large as steel net
imports (see Table 2), but the estimated coefficient for local demand (approximated by EU
construction or industrial indexes, both around 100) is three times larger
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Table 3: Regression estimations. Cement Net Import. ARIMA regressions
Cement 1999-2012 2004-2012
NImpCement,t (1) (2)
ConsEU,t−3 0.298 0.326
(2.39)** (2.38)**
IndBRICS,t−3 -0.344 -0.344
(3.45)*** (3.08)***
CO2pricet−3 -0.093
(0.51)
N 164 104
Loglikelihood -387.06 -242.98
AIC 798.12 511.95
BIC 835.32 546.33
Q 28.57 23.41
Prob>chi(40) 0.91 0.98
Table 4: Regression estimations. Cement Net Import. Prais-Winsten regres-
sions
Cement 1999-2012 2004-2012
NImpCement,t (1) bis (2) bis
ConsEU,t−3 0.580 0.469
(5.70)*** (4.08)***
IndBRICS,t−3 -0.100 -0.200
(4.56)*** (5.77)***
CO2pricet−3 0.036
(0.33)
N 165 105
Adjusted R2 0.27 0.48
R2 0.25 0.44
ρ 0.71 0.69
DW (original) 0.75 0.75
DW (transformed) 2.34 2.19
21
Table 5: Regression estimations. Steel Net Imports. ARIMA regression
NImpSteel,t 1999-2012 2004-2012
(3) (4)
IndEU,t−3 1.025 1.253
(3.15)*** (3.08)***
IndBRICS,t−3 0.117 0.015
(0.60) (0.06)
CO2pricet−3 0.103
(0.46)
N 164 104
Loglikelihood -501.15 -325.88
AIC 1022.29 675.77
BIC 1053.29 707.50
Q 51.83 30.41
Prob>chi(40) 0.10 0.86
Table 6: Regression estimations. Steel Net Import. Prais-Winsten regressions
Steel 1999-2012 2004-2012
NImpSteel,t (3) bis (4) bis
IndEU,t−3 1.411 1.480
(4.81)*** (4.20)***
IndBRICS,t−3 -0.184 -0.257
(3.38)*** (3.14)***
CO2pricet−3 0.129
(0.50)
N 165 105
Adjusted R2 0.13 0.21
R2 0.14 0.23
ρ 0.76 0.74
DW (original) 0.54 0.56
DW (transformed) 2.09 2.04
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though the CO2 price has exceeded 20 euros for more than two years during
the studied period. Although based on a longer time series and more elaborate
econometric techniques, this empirical work draws the same conclusion as the
previous empirical literature on carbon leakage and the EU ETS (Reinaud,
2008a; Lacombe, 2008; Sartor, 2013; Ellerman et al., 2010; Quirion, 2011). That
is, the adverse effects of the EU ETS on EITE industries promised by their trade
bodies (EAEII, 2010) have not been observed. Nevertheless, these sectors have
benefited from a generous free allocation of allowances due to member states at
first and economic recession afterwards (Branger et al., 2013). We cannot draw
a conclusion about the role of this free allocation in the absence of leakage.
In addition, our analysis considers only changes in the use of production ca-
pacities (operational leakage) in the short term, which could be due to market
share loss to foreign competitors, or to an optimization strategy of a global-
ized firm. It does not take into account changes in production capacities as the
result of the EU’s climate policy (investment leakage), which could be investi-
gated through foreign direct investment data (as in the original pollution haven
literature).
At the end of 2014, the mid-term review of the European Commission will re-
evaluate the methods of allocation, especially for sectors deemed to be exposed
to carbon leakage. Assumptions underlying the first evaluation in 2009 need
to be updated (De Bruyn et al., 2013). First, carbon prices are much lower
than those used for the elaboration of allowances rules (30 euros per tonne),
and so are additional carbon costs. Second, the EU ETS is linked with more
countries (Norway and Iceland joined the EU ETS) and other carbon markets
are emerging in several states (some of which are located in the first two emitting
countries, the US and China). This would lower the intensity of international
competition and would offset the growing integration of markets (especially in
the steel sector).
The exceptional growth of industrial activities in emerging countries and
the deindustrialisation of Europe are long-term trends. As it is impossible to
know what would have happened if the EU ETS had not existed (the “plague
of the counterfactual scenario” (Reinaud, 2008b)), environmental regulations
could be held responsible for what is actually a structural change. European
heavy industries would then put the blame on the EU ETS to ask for unjustified
help, as their trade associations have been actively lobbying to undermine re-
forms that would raise the environmental ambition of the EU ETS. The fear of
competitiveness and carbon leakage have led to generous free allocations, which
caused a surplus of allowances and the crash of their price, threatening the very
existence of the scheme. The collapse of the carbon price is a very serious issue,
as a 5 euro allowance price does not send the right signal in regards to investing
in low-carbon facilities. The future of European industry lies in technological
innovation and high-value-added products, which could be helped by a strong
price signal.
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Table 7: Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests for unit root
1999-2012 2004-2012
Test Statistic p_value Test Statistic p_value
NImpCement -2.527 0.1091 -1.578 0.4947
4NImpCement -18.849 0.0000 -14.275 0.0000
NImpSteel -2.881 0.0477 -2.013 0.2807
4NImpSteel -14.655 0.0000 -11.296 0.0000
IndEU -1.709 0.4266 -1.137 0.6999
4IndEU -11.065 0.0000 -7.683 0.0000
IndBRICS 0.730 0.9904 -0.636 0.8627
4IndBRICS -17.279 0.0000 -13.692 0.0000
ConsEU -1.425 0.5702 -0.770 0.8277
4ConsEU -18.429 0.0000 -14.566 0.0000
CO2price -2.094 0.2471
4CO2price -8.518 0.0000
The ADF model specified is model with constant
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